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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE

1I-

[ VOL. 43

POOR PERSONS

CPLR 1102(d).: Statute affords relief from expense of service of
summons by publication in divorce action.
CPLR 1102(d) provides in part that "a poor person shall not
be liable for the payment of any costs or fees. .. ." In Jeffreys v.
Jeffreys,4 5 a divorce action, the supreme court, Kings County, found
that the "poor persons" statute affords relief from the expense of
service of summons by publication.
In this case, since the plaintiff failed to give notice to the City
of the application to proceed as a poor person,4 6 the court directed
that the Corporation Counsel be served with notice of the application
to direct the Treasurer of the City of New York to pay the costs of
publication. The City appeared and consented to the motion. The
court stated that in the future all applicatiohs to proceed as a poor
person should be made on notice to the City, and all applications
requiring the City to pay the costs of publication should also be
made on notice.
The court reasoned that since only stenographic transcripts are
automatically furnished by statute upon notice of application to
proceed as a poor person,47 application for this further subsidy
should be on notice.
ARTICLE 14-

AcTIoNs BETWEEx JOINT ToRT-FEASORS

CPLR 1401.: Court distinguishes true, joint tort-feasors from
siccesswie tort-feasors.
48
In Kotler v. Moiiticello Hospital,
a medical malpractice action, plaintiff brought suit against defendants (hospital and physicians) for aggravation of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff had been fully compensated for his injuries and
had issued a satisfaction of judgment therefor. The court denied
the motion.
Plaintiff originally sued and obtained judgment in a personal
injury action against the automobile negligence defendants. Subsequent to the commencement of the present action, plaintiff executed
a satisfaction of judgment discharging those defendants at one half
the adjudicated damages. In support of the motion for summary
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46 See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 1101, supp. commentary 86 (1966).
47
See 2 WRINSTEN, Koux & Mni a, Nmv
CmL PRACTiCE

1101.13 (1967).

'Yom
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

judgment the present defendants contended that the plaintiff's election to proceed against the automobile negligence defendants in the
original action precluded the present action and that the discharge
of prior defendants by satisfaction of judgment discharged the
present defendants.
The primary and critical finding of the court was that the
present defendants and prior defendants were not joint but successive tort-feasorers. Through this finding the court distinguished
McTigue v. Levy,40 relied upon by the defendants. In a true joint
tort-feasor situation, a satisfaction of judgment recovered against
one joint tort-feasor discharges all joint tort-feasors.
The court then addressed itself to a determination of whether
plaintiff's attempt to recover against the malpractice defendants
would violate the rule barring a double satisfaction for a single
injury. The court stated that the word satisfaction contemplates
full and total compensation for the injuries suffered. When plaintiff
accepted what he could get from the judgment debtor and the
debtor's carrier he was merely getting part payment on account of
his injuries.
The court recognized that Milks v. Mclver,50 from the Court of
Appeals, holds that a general release given to the original wrongdoer bars action against the negligent physician who aggravates the
damages. However, in Milks, the release given to the original
wrongdoer was clearly with a view to cover both original and
aggravated injuries. In the instant case, the malpractice action
was pending when the satisfaction of judgment was given for an
amount much less than that of the judgment. Thus, the contention that it was intended to cover all the injuries was negated.51
ARTICLE

30-

REmEDIES AND PLEADING

CPLR 3012.: Court dismisses plaintiff's action because of false
affidavit.
In DiRusso v. Kravitz,52 plaintiff served a summons without a
complaint. After plaintiff failed to comply with defendant's demand
for a complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), defendant moved to
dismiss. The plaintiff then interposed an affidavit stating that he
was unable to serve a complaint because of ill health. The court
accepted this excuse and denied defendant's motion.
App. Div. 928, 23 N.Y.S2d 114 (2d Dep't 1940).
50264 N.Y. 267 (1934).
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.' See, e.g., Rask v. County of Nassau, 24 App. Div. 2d 580, 262 N.Y.S.2d
56 (2d Dep't 1965).
5227 App. Div. 2d 926, 279 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21
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